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unknown relation between the various elements that drive market dynamics and the large
variety of market organizations, findings, however, might hold only within the specific mar-
ket settings. In this paper we propose a framework for building agent-based artificial stock
markets. We present the mechanism of the framework based on a previously identified list
of organizational and behavioural aspects. Within the framework experiments with arbi-
trary many trading strategies, acting in various market organizations can be conducted in a
flexible way, without changing its architecture. In this way experiments of other artificial
stock markets, as well as theoretical models can be replicated and their findings compared.
Comparisons of the different experimental results might indicate whether findings are due
to traders’ behaviour or to the chosen market structure and could suggest how to improve
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1 Introduction
Artificial stock markets (ASM’s) are primarily designed to help us understand market dynam-
ics. Several ASM’s provide a tool to test theoretical hypothesis, these being commonly the
efficient market hypotheses and rational expectations hypotheses (Chen and Yeh, 2001; Brock
and Hommes, 1997; Loistl and Vetter, 2000). Further, several ASM’s try to study what kind
of structures and behaviours can reproduce time series with similar characteristics as on real
markets (Hommes, 2001; Gaunersdorfer et al., 2001). The question is, however, what are the
properties of the time series on the market? The answer is not univocal. Some people argue that
prices follow a random walk, others seem to find patterns (”stylized facts”) in series. Are those
there by chance or is there some predictability in the prices?
In the ASM’s, the successfulness of different traders can be studied since traders make
different predictions regarding future values. Most of the studies compare successfulness of
fundamentalists versus technical analysts, or of random trading agents against learning agents
and, indeed, find differences in their wealth outcomes (Hommes, 2001; LeBaron, 2002). Of its
own trying to find prosperous strategies is not a scientific goal. However, repeated successful-
ness of technical analysts over fundamentalists indicates predictability in the time series which
reflects inefficiency in the markets. Experiments with inefficient markets might indicate what
kind of organizational changes should be made in order to make them more efficient and in this
way improve market quality.
Artificial stock markets are however, as LeBaron (2001) states ”only toy models that repre-
sent a complicated social situation in a highly stylized fashion”. Given the difficulty to analyze
how strong the connection of market models (theoretical, empirical, experimental or agent-
based) to the real markets is, opinions regarding their validity are extremely diversified. As
LeBaron notices, the benefits of agent-based ASM’s lie in the ”large number of parameters for
which our priors are extremely diffuse”, however, this peculiarity makes them also difficult to
validate.
Two important features of ASM’s in relation to other market models and real stock markets
are emphasized: our diffuse priors and the ability to handle large number of parameters.
Taking into account a large number of parameters, on the one hand, turns market models to
contain more representative elements of the de facto microstructure of stock markets, strength-
ening their validity. Given the changing and large variety of market organizations and the several
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”hidden” features, such as details behind price formation mechanisms and traders’ decision, on
the other hand, imply broadly diffuse prior assumptions. Consequently, the dilemma that one
has to deal with, when representing markets is, for which prior to choose for, how valid is the
assumption, and how does the choice influence the dynamics.
In ASM’s in the literature a common choice is to study call markets and investor type of be-
haviour. Regarding the price formation mechanisms and trading strategies behind this commons
structure even, several interpretations and implementations are given. The diverse possibilities
to represent markets and traders, the implementation difficulties and the several unconsidered
market features by the current ASM’s discussed in (Boer et al., 2005) motivated us to design an
ASM framework that aims to be more representative and to cover the missing features.
In this article we introduce the framework that provides a tool for representing several types
of markets and an arbitrary number of trading strategies. We design and describe the frame-
work based on the list of organizational and behavioural critical factors that we have identified
in a previous article, and on the analysis of several artificial stock markets presented regarding
these factors (see Boer et al. (2005)). By designing this framework we aim to achieve multi-
ple objectives. First of all, we would like to experiment with rarely studied market types and
behaviours (such as: continuous trading sessions, brokers, market maker based price settings,
autonomously and asynchronously acting agents) by incorporating these features in the frame-
work or allowing for their flexible implementation. Further, we aim to replicate, test and validate
some of the existing artificial markets on the top of the framework. In this way, the introduced
framework can help us to study whether findings of experiments within different market models
can globally explain some market dynamics or are the results of the chosen settings.
The outline of this article is as follows. In Section 2 we present briefly the structure of the
framework. In Section 3 we elaborate on the organizational features of the framework, pointing
to the various market setting possibilities. Then, in Section 4 we discuss the generic behaviour
of the different market participants and the possibility to flexibly plug-in various strategy imple-
mentations. A short evaluation of the framework regarding its accuracy is provided in Section 5
through some simple implementations and analysis of the experimental results. Discussion and
future research finalize the paper in Section 6.
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2 The structure of the framework
Trading in a market is organized around three main components: the instruments that are traded,
the market participants who handle and the institutional structure behind price formation. The
institutional structure, that is market microstructure, directly drives the price formation mecha-
nism and defines the type of a market. Instruments, namely stocks are issued by certain compa-
nies, representing part of ownership, and their value, or better said valuation depends therefore
on the performance of the company. Being the object of exchange however, they are more or less
part of the market where they are traded, their value being influenced as by issuer specific news,
as well as by the market organization and by the decision of the market participants. Regarding
the market participants, we differentiate two types of them (see Boer and Kaymak (2003) and
Boer et al. (2005)), financial traders, like brokers or market makers, who have specific well-
defined roles, and investors, who are in fact, not internal part of the market organization, but
can observe it, make trading decisions and send their orders to participants on the market place.
According to the discussion above, the framework consists of three main components (Fig-
ure 1):
• the marketplace;
• the set of investors;
• an information source.
The existence of brokers and market makers, and their behaviour is strongly related to the
market organization: they have special roles and tasks, and their activities can be regulated by
trading rules, that are part of the market structure. Investors, however do not have a special role
within the market, and therefore function more or less independently. As a consequence, the
marketplace represents the institutional structure behind price formation, and includes subcom-
ponents of the financial traders such as brokers and market makers. Further, market specific
features of stocks that can be traded on a specific market are also defined here. Market partic-
ipants who act in fact from outside the institutional structure, that is investors are represented
separately. As a consequence, they can trade in multiple markets if they wish so. The infor-
mation source component is introduced to represent information coming from the issuer and is
designed with the aim to generate news related to stocks traded on the market, such as dividends
and information regarding the fundamental value.
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Figure 1: The components of the framework
3 Organizational aspects
Given the various market organizations and trading strategies, we decided not to focus on a
specific market structure, but to allow for experiments in multiple trading environments. There-
fore we design a framework that can be configured to experiment with various market types
and traders. During the design phase we take into account the institutional organization of stock
markets and several market models. The list of organizational and behavioural factors identified
by Boer et al. (2005) drive the presentation of the framework. When designing the framework
we primarily focused on the representation of the perceived ignored features of stock markets,
like continuous trading sessions. However, we intended to incorporate the structure of ASM’s
from the literature in order to replicate and test their results. In this section we discuss how
the organizational factors: instruments, orders, market participants, trading sessions, execution
systems, protocols and transparency; are represented in the framework, such that it can reflect
multiple market structures. Behavioural aspects are focused in the next section.
• Traded instruments
A number of risky stocks can be traded within the framework, all identified with a unique
symbol. However, like the majority of the ASM’s, for the time being, we focus on ex-
periments with trading one risky stock. Cash supplies are available to express the risk
free choice of traders. The information source component that represents the issuer can
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generate dividends and fundamental values if required, and inform traders about the new
values. The algorithms behind news-generation can be flexibly varied and extended.
• Orders
Both limit and market orders can be placed by traders acting within the framework. Or-
ders are characterized by a stock name, size, side, quoted price and time-stamp.
• Market participants
In contrast to existing artificial stock markets, featuring only investors and (rarely) market
makers, in the introduced framework, next to investors and market makers, brokers can
interact. The presence of brokers is required, for example, in markets where continuous
double-auctions can be conducted, like the NYSE. If necessary brokers can be excluded
from experiments, for instance, in order to replicate experiments of ASM’s that do not
implement them. There is at least one market-maker assigned to each stock, responsible
for the liquidity of the stock. If an implementation on top of the framework allows for
more market makers taking responsibility for the same stock, the structure reflects dealer-
markets. The detailed generic behaviour of the market participants within the framework
is discussed in the next section.
• Trading sessions
Since continuous trading sessions are very common on stock markets (Harris, 2003; De-
marchi and Foucault, 2000) but are rarely encountered in current ASM’s, we focus on im-
plementing a continuous trading mechanism. However, since most artificial markets im-
plement call-auctions, experiments with markets where trading occurs at discrete points
in time can be also conducted within the framework.
• Execution systems
We support the representation of two types of continuous market structures: with and
without continuous double-auctions. A market with continuous double-auction repre-
sents, for example, the trading mechanism on the NYSE. In addition the framework pro-
vides the possibility to implement hybrid markets, like continuous markets with call-
auctions to determine the opening and the closing prices, given that the organization of
markets in this way is very common (Demarchi and Foucault, 2000).
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We consider continuous structures as quote-driven markets, where market makers quote
bids and asks. Experiments with several continuous execution systems can be conducted
within the framework, depending on the implemented and configured bid-ask quoting
strategy of the market makers.
Call auctions within the framework are designed to represent price-driven markets. Sev-
eral call-auction related execution systems within the framework for setting market prices
can be flexibly implemented again on top of the framework.
• Protocols
Protocols are related to the type of the trading session and specific execution mecha-
nism applied within the framework. In general, based on the specified market type, they
might refer to the tick-size, the upper and lower limit of a bid-ask spread, the number of
call-auctions that should be conducted, the time interval between two call-auctions, the
specification of events that can trigger call-auctions on hybrid markets (e.g. the intensity
of change in prices), the (simulated) length of a trading day, etc.
• Transparency
Regarding the publication of a-priori information: historical price series, the bid-ask
quotes of the market maker, and eventually news provided by the information-source
component, for example concerning the fundamental value, is available. The limit-order-
book is theoretically closed, however, depending on the market-maker’s bid-ask quoting
strategy the best ask and offer might be visible. In the future we might consider experi-
menting with open book trading as well.
Post-trade information, regarding the transactions, is made public to all the participants.
The identity of the traders participating in transactions is registered for statistical reasons,
but it can be hidden from other participants if wished so.
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4 Price formation and behavioural aspects
While in the previous section we focused on the organizational aspects of the markets that
can be implemented within the framework, in this section we focus on the ”black-box” feature
of the markets and describe the design bed of price formation mechanisms and traders. We
base the description again on the behavioural factors identified by Boer et al. (2005). In order
to allow for the flexible representation of price formation mechanisms and experiments with
different trading strategies, the framework incorporates only the skeletons for the three trader
types, that is market makers, brokers and investors. Skeletons represent the basic structure and
generic behaviour of the traders. On top of the skeletons traders’ specific behaviours (strategies)
can be implemented. Since we have chosen for an artificial agent-based implementation of
the traders, we illustrate them by focusing on their environment-sensing, decision making and
acting behaviour (see Russell and Norvig (1995)).
4.1 Order-placing behaviours
Orders are primarily initiated by investors as a result of some portfolio management process.
From the point of view of an outsider, an investor performs the following generic behaviour:
• it continually senses its environment;
• makes trading decisions that result in orders;
• contacts financial agents to ask them to execute the generated orders.
What we do not know, however, is the process and reasoning behind trading decisions, that
is for us a sort of partially black box. The framework is designed in a way to reflect the generic
behaviour of investors (Figure 2). Accordingly, we represent the trading decision of investors
as a ”black box”.
As suggested by the behavioural finance literature, illustrated by the various ASM imple-
mentations, and discussed by Boer et al. (2005), arbitrary many strategies might exist behind
trading decisions. In general, as theory describes, trading decisions are driven by portfolio man-
agement processes (Reilly and Brown, 2003). Accordingly, trading decisions are based on the
individual investment strategies that try to meet the particular policy statement guidelines, and
reflect the portfolio construction and maintenance decision of the investors resulting in orders.
8
Figure 2: The generic behaviour of investors
Given that the strategy behind the trading decision is a kind of varying ”black box”, what
we need to take care of when designing the generic behaviour of the investor is:
• how and when to trigger the trading decision, and
• to process the resulted orders.
In the framework, a trading decision can be triggered, whenever:
• confirmation to the investor arrives, that one, or part of its placed orders is executed;
• news is published or event happens on the market that is sensed by the investor, e.g., new
bid and ask quotes are published by the market maker, transaction occurs or news related
to the fundamental value of a stock is diffused;
• spontaneously, the investor decides to review and manage its portfolio.
The trading decision can result in a set of orders, but investors might decide as well not
to place any order for the moment. Focusing on one type of stock for the time being, in the
experiments conducted, investors decide to place either a single order or no order at all.
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The framework contains only the skeleton, that provides the generic investor-type of behav-
iour, it does not include however a specific trading strategy, but an empty placeholder on top
of which different strategies can be implemented. In this way experiments with arbitrary types
of investors can be conducted in a flexible way. Various investors can be set to behave, for
example, like the traders at SantaFe (LeBaron, 2002), KapSyn (Loistl and Vetter, 2000) or at a
sort of ”business school” (Chen and Yeh, 2001) trying to maximize a specific utility function, or
use arbitrage opportunities like traders in other markets (e.g.; Das (2003), Chen et al. (2001)).
Further, if required they could generate orders with random values like traders in (Shatner et al.,
2000; Chan and Shelton, 2001) or (Das, 2003), trade a predefined fraction of their portfolio
(Raberto et al., 2001; Shatner et al., 2000) and use a variety of fundamental and/or technical
strategies to forecast future values. An investor component in the framework is characterized in
this way, besides its portfolio, by the particular strategy applied to make trading decisions.
4.2 Order execution behaviours
4.2.1 Order execution by brokers
Brokers on financial markets are primarily entitled to execute orders on behalf of investors. In
accordance to this specific role, the decisions they are faced with are discussed by Boer et al.
(2005). Similarly to the investors’ skeleton the design of the brokers within the framework
involves just their generic behaviour, the chosen strategies behind the decision problems being
at the users’ freedom.
As illustrated by Figure 3, a broker’s common behaviour consists of the following main
tasks:
• receive orders from investors, and
• eventually, listen to other information;
• decide which received orders to execute first, and how to execute them;
• make transactions if decided to execute orders.
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Figure 3: The generic behaviour of brokers
There are several selection scenarios possible for deciding which of the orders to handle
next. A broker might select, for example:
• the order with the earliest arrival time (FIFO mechanism); or
• with the best execution probability (considering current market conditions); or
• aggregate and try to execute more orders at once with similar parameters.
An order is selected in view of possible trading mechanisms. In a general case the broker
has three choices:
• match orders internally: if, for example, there are other received orders in the order book
that clear at a price close to the current market price;
• try to negotiate with other brokers within the market makers’ quoted spread, for instance,
through double-auction, like at NYSE;
• define a new (improved) limit price for the order based on market conditions in order to
submit it to a third party for execution, such as market maker or central matching system.
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Brokers are allowed to negotiate among each-other only within the specified bid/ask spread.
It does not make sense to negotiate outside it, as then it would be more profitable for one
of the parties to trade with the market maker. Brokers might apply a variety of negotiation
strategies. The decision they take during the negotiation strategy results either in a new quote
or the acceptance of a quote made by another market participant. Several decisions has to be
taken if brokers choose to negotiate, such as: the offered negotiation price, the values with
which the negotiation price should change and the time-length for which they are trying to
negotiate. These values might depend on the actual quote of the market maker, the offers that
other brokers make for negotiation purposes, the initial limit price of the selected order, etc..
If the broker decides to accept an order, or his placed order is accepted, a transaction price is
defined, a deal is made and the transaction price of this deal is published as the new market
price.
The way brokers analyze information, and interpret it to select and execute orders, or to
define a negotiation strategy can take arbitrary many forms. Therefore we build the archi-
tecture of the brokers in such a way to allow for the implementation and experiments with
multiple strategies. Since, unfortunately, it is not clear how in reality brokers solve all the de-
cision problems that they face, we have to experiment with a number of possible solutions.
Allowing for multiple strategies enables us to study how the brokers’ success and the market
dynamics depend on the strategy applied. Hence, the framework again, contains the skeleton
that provides the implementation of the generic behaviour of broker-agents without a concrete
strategy-implementation.
4.2.2 Market makers
We define market makers as financial agents on quote-driven markets with the specific role
to provide liquidity for the stocks they are responsible for. Accordingly, when designing the
behaviour of market makers we focus on the representation of this particular feature. According
to the generic behaviour of market makers described by (Boer et al., 2005), and illustrated by
Figure 4, the tasks that market makers need to repeatedly carry out, is to:
• determine bid and ask quotes at which they are willing to trade;
• receive orders and execute them against the quoted bid-ask values if possible;
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• enter the received orders into the limit order book if they could not have been (completely)
executed.
The question and the main decision problem market makers are faced with, is:
• when and how to set the bid-ask quotes in order to reflect market conditions and to provide
liquidity?
The strategy that governs their decision depends on the market organization where they
interact, but also on individual and situational characteristics. In principle, they reconsider the
bid and ask quotes in two main situations:
• whenever new orders arrive; or
• they perceive the stock they are responsible for is not liquid enough, that is reflected for
example, by the fact that no orders arrive after a while.
Additionally, other considerations, like belief that current quotes do not reflect market condi-
tions, can lead market makers to revise the bid and ask.
Figure 4: The behaviour of market makers
Market makers apply various strategies to set their bid and ask quotes. In order to allow
for experiments with multiple market maker types, the skeleton of the market makers again
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does not provide a concrete solution to this decision problem, but an empty placeholder to be
extended with user-defined strategies. Experiments with several market making algorithms can
be conducted and compared in this way: such as bid-ask determinations based on Bayesian
learning as implemented by (Das, 2003), or based on position imbalance and a threshold like
in (Chan and Shelton, 2001), or simply based on the content of the limit order book, like in
KapSyn (Loistl and Vetter, 2000) or in continuous automated auctions.
4.2.3 Automated and equilibrium-based execution of orders
Order execution on automated continuous markets can be in fact considered a special bid-ask
quoting strategy of the market maker. Therefore, in this last short section, we would like to
focus only on the way equilibrium prices are and/or can be determined during call auctions. In
the framework we let this task as well to be carried out by market makers as a specific auctioneer
behaviour. Based on the study in (Boer et al., 2005) we define the generic auctioneer behaviour
of market maker as consisting of the following steps (Figure 5):
• collect orders during a call;
• determine new equilibrium price based on the received orders;
• execute the orders that fit this price.
Figure 5: Price formation at equilibrium
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Again, the strategy used for determining the equilibrium price varies from market to market
and, in fact, often is not clear how it is solved in real markets. In the framework therefore, we
just provide an empty placeholder for it, and implementations plugged in by users determine
the final strategy. Consequently, experiments with several different strategies can be conducted,
that can be, for example, the supply and demand intersection as implemented by Raberto et al.
(2001) or Brock and Hommes (1998), based on excess demand like in (Chen and Yeh, 2001),
or at highest volume, as determined in (Loistl and Vetter, 2000).
5 Verification and validation
In the previous sections we have described the framework and discussed how can be strategies
and market types configured on top of it in a flexible way. In this section we focus on bench-
mark cases in order to test the accuracy of the framework, in various situations. It should be
noted, that, since the framework is just an environment to support the design of several market
organizations and trading strategies, it has to be always validated together with an implementa-
tion. Validation of market models with respect to real markets is, however, extremely difficult
if not impossible, given the ”diffuse priors” as discussed by LeBaron (2001). Therefore, in this
section we deal with the problem of ”building the model right”, that is verification, and, for the
time being, we set aside the problem of validation, that deals with ”building the right model”
(see Balci (1998)). In this section we aim thus, to test whether the focused implementation
functions correctly, as expected. Consequently, within the scope of this article we implement
simple analytically tractable models, the functioning of which can be separately tested as well.
5.1 Experimental settings
In the experiments that we describe here there is one stock traded, one market maker, and
more investors are represented. Trading takes place in continuous quote-driven trading sessions.
Investor-agent(s), representing one or more investors, continuously place orders based on their
strategy and the information that they observe (e.g. fundamental value, market prices, bid-ask
quotes of the market maker). The market price is formed at the bid or ask quote of the market
maker, depending on whether a sell or a buy order was matched against it. Market makers
in different experiments define the bid and ask quotes based on the orders they receive and
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particular strategies implemented and plugged in on top of the skeletons.
At the beginning of the experiments, there is an initial P0 market price and s-spread value
given, and the bid and ask price quotes of the market maker are set to s/2 distance from the
market price. In case of markets where only market orders are placed with the same size, the
size is set to 1, in the rest of the cases there is no size quoted, so transactions will not occur at
this initial quote. In the experiments described below: P0 is set to 100, and s is set to 1.
5.1.1 The Roll model
The first market type we have conducted experiments with is based on the model introduced by
Roll, as described in (Campbell et al., 1997). The reason why we have chosen for this model, is
that it is analytical and as such, the properties of the generated price series can be analytically
deduced and compared thus to the properties of the simulated results.
In the Roll model, the market maker sets the bid and ask quotes around the fundamental
value (FV ) he perceives (FV − s/2, and FV + s/2). Investors are represented by a single
investor-agent, who continuously places market orders with the same probability regarding the
trading side. Market prices result from matching the orders to the quotes of the market maker.
We have conducted experiments with two different settings regarding the fundamental value.
In the first one, fundamental value is fixed and does not change during the experiments, in the
second one, the fundamental value changes randomly following a normal distribution with mean
100 and deviation 1. The market maker senses the changes regarding the fundamental value and
adapts the bid-ask quotes accordingly.
5.1.2 The continuous automated model
In the second type of the experiments conducted the strategy applied by the market maker
to determine the bid and ask quotes reflects the automated order matching mechanism. The
bid is defined as the buy-order from the limit order book with the highest quoted price, and
respectively, the ask is defined as the buy-order from the limit order book with the lowest quoted
price. Investors continuously place limit orders. The orders that match the quoted bid-ask are
executed, the rest is entered into the limit order book. The ask price is always higher than the
bid price because orders in the order book cannot be matched, as otherwise a transaction would
have been occurred beforehand. If there are no orders on one side of the order book, the quoted
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price is of one initial spread difference from the quote of the other side, and there is no volume
quoted.
Investors are again represented by a singe investor-agent, who continuously generates ran-
dom orders. The side of an order is generated with an equal probability to be buy or sell, the
number of shares offered or asked is multiple of 100 and below 10000. The price quoted is
pseudo-randomly generated, from a normal distribution around a certain mean, with a given
standard deviation.
We conducted a number of experiments within this model, where the type of the investors
changes regarding the value of the mean and the standard deviation. The mean depends on the
”memory” of the market maker, that is the average of the past k market prices, k taking the
values of 1, 10 and 100. Three round of experiments are conducted with these mean settings
and a predefined standard deviation, that is set to 1.
5.2 Experimental results
For each type of market setting we have conducted five rounds of experiments for time intervals
of: 5, 10, 15, 30 and 60 minutes. The size of the time series generated varies from around
1500 (in 5-minute experiments) to around 30000 (in 1-hour experiments). In general 300-500
transactions have been made during a minute. The number of transactions depends of course
on the market structure with respect to the time it takes the investor to place new orders and
with respect to the time it takes the market maker to handle orders and to set new bid and ask
quotes. Given that the behaviour of market maker is computationally more intricate than the
investors’ behaviour, we delayed investors’ decision with 0.1 seconds. By this we tried to avoid
to overload the market makers with orders. In the continuous automated model based on best
bid and ask there are in general slightly less transactions conducted than in the Roll model. The
reason behind this phenomenon is the fact that there is not always a match when limit orders
are placed, while in the Roll model a transaction is possible with any received order.
5.2.1 The Roll model
As proven in the analytical model introduced by Roll, described also in Campbell et al. (1997),
the bid-ask spread has an impact on the time series properties of the returns, namely negative
serial correlation. The explanation in the simplest case is, that if the fundamental price does
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not change, the bid and ask quotes will not change either, and as a consequence the measure of
change between two consecutive market prices is either 0, or the spread, or the negative spread.
There are, thus, never two consecutive increases or decreases in the price, and accordingly,
the value of correlation is independent of the spread and equals −0.5. Furthermore, even if the
fundamental price changes, it is shown that the serial correlation of returns is non positive, given
that changes in the fundamental are serially uncorrelated and independent of the probability of
generated order side.
Based on the theoretical findings with respect to the Roll model, we analyzed the auto-
correlation of returns generated by the experiments we have conducted with the implemented
version of the Roll model. We have found that, indeed, in all the experiments the autocorrelation
is −0.5 in case of the simple Roll model, and it is negative as well in experiments conducted
with changing fundamental value. This finding proves the correctness of the functioning of the
framework with the implementation of the Roll model as a form of bid-ask quoting strategy.
It is interesting to observe that the kurtosis of the returns in the general model is close to 3,
and the skewness is close to 0 in all the experiments, indicating that returns are almost normally
distributed. The reason behind this phenomenon is the fact that fundamental values based on
which bid and ask quotes are determined are randomly generated, taken from a set of normally
distributed values.
Further, the autocorrelation of the squired returns is close to 0.2 in all the experiments, sug-
gesting that there might be ”volatility clusters” present. Similar results are found by Alexander
(2001, pp67) for the empirical data studied. Strong autocorrelation is however, not a proof in
itself for volatility clusters, it can just be an implication of it!
Regarding the Roll measure, developed by Roll to estimate the spread when quote date
is not available, we found that in the simple model, the estimated spread equals indeed the
quoted spread, that is 1. However, in the general model, this is not the case, the estimated
spread being more than twice higher than the real spread, which is still 1. The reason behind
this phenomenon is that: as fundamental value changes every time, bid and ask quotes change
continuously, and thus the difference between two consecutive transactions is very probably
high. And, since fundamental value always changes, there are never two transactions conducted
at the same quotes.
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5.2.2 The continuous automated model
The characteristics of the time series generated by the continuous automated model slightly dif-
fer from the results of the Roll model, fact that proves the impact of price formation mechanism
on price dynamics. In contrast to the first model, we found that prices in the continuous au-
tomated market are strongly autocorrelated, around 0.8-0.9. This phenomenon can be implied
by the way limit orders are generated, that is around the last market price. Further, sometimes
strong autocorrelation of squared returns can be noticed, feature that indicates the possible pres-
ence of volatility clusters.
Such as in the Roll model, negative autocorrelation of return values can be observed again.
The value in this case is around -0.2. This findings strengthens the observation that the bid-ask
has a negative impact on returns.
We have also looked at the estimated spread using the Roll measure and found that it is
lower with around 0.2 than quoted spread. Similar findings are presented in the experiments
described by Theissen (2000), pointing out that the Roll measure is not an accurate measure
of the transaction costs. The possible explanation behind this phenomenon is that not all the
bid-ask quotes placed end immediately in transactions, based on which the estimated spread is
calculated. Further, transactions can be fractions of quoted volumes. Interestingly, the quoted
spread is around 0.5 in all the experiments.
We have additionally conducted experiments, in which we have adapted the standard devia-
tion to the deviation of the historical time series of the market prices in similar way as the mean.
As expected, the limit order prices and as a consequence, the market prices quickly converged
to a single price in that case.
6 Discussion and further research
Based on the experiments we can say that the framework functions correctly with the imple-
mentations considered, as it behaves in similar way as the analytical form of the implemented
models. Real markets are, however, much more intricate than analytically tractable models and,
given that their dynamics is not understood, validating the framework against them is extremely
difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, the complex feature of market dynamics is the
reason why models are needed to understand them. Although, we have presented and tested
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simple implementations in this paper for verification purposes, our aim with the framework,
as pointed out by the way it is designed is to conduct experiments in more realistic trading
environments.
Running Sample
The Skeleton of an Agent
call
External Strategy Implementations
implements
strategy
agent
skeleton
create
empty placeholders
(definition)
strategy-functions
…
…
AbstractStrategy.Functions
…
...
Abstract Strategy Interface
Agent Implementation
implementation
strategy-functions
Strategy
Implementation_NEW
implementation
strategy-functions
Strategy
Implementation_1
implementation
strategy-functions
Strategy
Implementation_N
NEW_Agent Instance
Agent Instance_X
…
ReadConfigurations
CreateAgents
…
Agent Manager
$$
Agent Instance_Y
. . .
Configuration
description
implemented
strategies
description
trader typeschoose
register
read
call
Figure 6: Sample skeleton with implemented strategies
We believe that in order to be able to provide acceptably accurate explanation and analysis
of the workings of the financial markets several features of them should be represented. This is
why we have chosen for an agent-based micro-simulation approach based on market microstruc-
ture literature when designing the artificial stock market framework. In order to allow for the
representation of ”diffuse priors” regarding the workings of financial markets we do not choose
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for a certain market mechanism, but for a framework with the help of which experiments with
arbitrary many types of trading strategies in various trading environments can be conducted and
compared (Figure 6).
During the design of the framework aimed for studying stock markets that we propose in
this paper we have striven to represent the perceived shortcomings of ASM’s in the literature,
discussed in a previous article (see Boer et al. (2005)). In accordance, the framework allows for
continuous trading, asynchronous and autonomous decision making and considers the different
roles traders have to fulfill in the market. In contrast to most of the ASM’s in the literature, the
framework is not centralized. Traders are not centrally directed, but are individual, autonomous
elements. They decide when to place an order in function of the type of the market where they
interact. Autonomy results from the agent-based implementation that we have chosen.
The framework we propose in this article allows for testing for previous findings in the
literature; for studying how different market structures with the joint influence of various types
of agents affect market characteristics; and for analyzing whether some behaviours can be more
successful than others in certain environments. Further, it allows for studying which features of
the market prices are due to learning, adaptation and which are coming from the structure of the
market itself. All these studies serve to test the quality of markets having different structures
and might indicate the changes that need to be made in order to improve market quality.
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